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NOTES
PROPERTY-FUTURE INTERESTS-PARTITION BY REMAINDER-
MEN ALLOWED. Henry v. Kennedy, 273 Ark. 383, 619 S.W.2d 632
(1981).
J.C. Kennedy died owning 560 acres in Desha County, Arkan-
sas. He devised a life estate to his widow with a remainder, in equal
shares, to his nephews Wilburn Kennedy and Cecil Kennedy. Wil-
burn Kennedy conveyed his undivided one-half remainder interest
to E.R. Henry, Jr. and Sterling L. Henry. The Henrys petitioned for
partition under the Arkansas partition statute,' as owners of one-
half of the remainder interest, against Cecil Kennedy. Because the
property was not susceptible to partition in kind, the chancery court
ordered a sale of the property, subject to the widow's life estate. On
appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed, holding that re-
maindermen have no right to bring a partition action against other
remaindermen when they have no present possessory interest in the
property.2 On certiorari, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed,
holding that citizens of Arkansas who have a remainder interest in
property may compel partition of their future interests regardless of
whether they have any present possessory interest. Henry v. Ken-
nedy, 273 Ark. 383, 619 S.W.2d 632 (1981).
The right to partition 3 originated very early in English law.4
1. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1801 (1962) provides:
Any persons having any interest in and desiring a division of land held in joint
tenancy, in common, as assigned or unassigned dower, as assigned or unassigned
curtesy, or in coparceny, absolutely or subject to the life estate of another, or other-
wise, or under an estate by the entirety where said owners shall have been divorced
either prior or subsequent to the passage of this Act, except where the property
involved shall be a homestead and occupied by either of said divorced persons,
shall file in the circuit or chancery court a written petition in which a description of
the property, the names of those having an interest in it, and the amount of such
interest shall be briefly stated in ordinary language, with a prayer for the division,
and for a sale thereof if it shall appear that partition cannot be made without great
prejudice to the owners, and thereupon all persons interested in the property who
have not united in the petition shall be summoned to appear.
2. Kennedy v. Henry, 270 Ark. 275, 604 S.W.2d 585 (Ct. App. 1980).
3. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1008 (5th ed. 1979) defines "partition" as "[t]he dividing
of lands held by joint tenants, coparceners, or tenants in common, into distinct portions, so
that they may hold them in severalty."
4. Eg., Patel v. Premabhai, [1954] A.C. 35; 2A R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROP-
ERTY 1 289 (1977).
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Because co-owners were forced to share the possession of land, the
original purpose of partition was to alleviate the inconvenience of
joint possession.5 By the end of the thirteenth century, the common-
law writ departitionefacienda was available to coparceners.6 The
right to compel partition was extended by statute in the mid-1500s
to include joint tenants and tenants in common.' Persons owning
future interests were not afforded the right to partition because they
did not have present possession.
The statutory right to partition in Arkansas was originally en-
acted in 1838,9 and included essentially the same text as the English
5. E.g., Duke v. Allen, 198 Ky. 368, 248 S.W. 894 (1923); 4 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1764 (2d ed. 1956).
6. Eg., Miller v. Warmington, 37 Eng. Rep. 452 (1820); 4 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, Supra
note 5, at § 1762; 2A R. POWELL, supra note 4, at $ 289. Coparceners are persons who
become concurrent owners by inheritance from a common ancestor. Id
7. 31 Henry VIII, c. 1 (1539); 32 Henry VIII, c. 32 (1540). 4 L. SIMES & A. SMITH,
supra note 5, at § 1762; 2A R. POWELL, supra note 4, at 289. 31 Henry VIII, c. 1 (1539), as
quoted in Shaw v. August, 266 Mich. 634, 254 N.W. 231 (1934), provided:
That all joint tenants and tenants in common, that now be, or hereafter shall be, of
any estate or estates of inheritance in their own rights, or in the right of their wives,
of any manors lands tenements or heriditaments within this Realm of England,
Wales, or the Marches of the same, shall and may be coacted and compelled, by
Virtue of this present act, to make partition between them of all such manors lands
tenements and heriditaments as they now hold, or hereafter shall hold as joint
tenants or tenants in common, by Writ De participatione facienda, in that case to
be devised in the King our Sovereign Lord's Court of Chancery, in like manner
and form as coparceners by the common laws of this realm have been and are
compellable to do, and the same Writ to be pursued at the Common Law.
8. E.g., Moore v. Shannon, 17 D.C. (6 Mackey) 157 (1887); Brown v. Brown, 8 N.H. 93
(1835); Nichols v. Nichols, 28 Vt. 228 (1856); A. FREEMAN, COTENANCY AND PARTITION
§§ 440, 446 (2d ed. 1886); 4 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, at § 1764. Since the purpose
of partition was to avoid the inconvenience of joint possession, the nonpossessory future
interests did not come within the purview of the common-law rule. Id.
An exception is made to the common-law rule in one situation: partition is allowed
when a "future interest would be possessory but for the existence of a present estate for years
or at will." Id See, e.g., Woodworth v. Campbell, 5 Paige Ch. 518 (N.Y. 1835); Rawson v.
Brown, 104 Ohio St. 537, 136 N.E. 209 (1922).
Although actual or constructive possession was required for partition at common law, a
remainderman has neither. The remainderman's estate vests in possession infuturo, and his
only means of partition must be statutory. C. KNAPP, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PARTI-
TION OF REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY 92 (1887).
9. Revised Statutes, ch. 107 § 1 (1838) provided:
Where any lands, tenements, or hereditaments shall be held in joint tenancy, ten-
ancy in common, or co-parcenary, whether such right or title be derived by
purchase, devise or descent, or whether any, all, or part, of such claimants, be of
full age, or minors, it shall be lawful for any one or more of the persons interested
by themselves, if of full age, or by their guardian, if minors, to present to the circuit
court of the county where such lands or tenements lie, (or, where the lands lie in
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statutes.' 0 In 1882 the Arkansas Supreme Court linked the com-
mon-law and statutory requirements for partition, stating that an
action "lies only for those who are in possession as joint tenants,
tenants in common, or coparceners." In 1940, the requisites of
possession and cotenancy became synonymous in a significant Ar-
kansas decision, Krickerberg v. Hoff.12 In that case, Hoff owned
property in fee simple, subject to a life estate in an undivided one-
different counties, to the circuit court of either or all such counties) their petition
praying for a division and partition of such premises, according to the respective
rights of the parties interested therein, and for a sale thereof, if it shall appear that
partition cannot be made without great prejudice to the owners.
This provision was later combined with ARK. CIVIL CODE § 538 (1869) which stated:
Any person desiring a division of land, held in joint tenancy, in common or in
coparcenary, or an allotment of dower, by the Probate Court, shall file in said
court, or in the clerk's office thereof, in vacation, a written petition, in which a
description of the property, the names of those having an interest in it, and the
amount of such interest, shall be briefly stated in ordinary language, with a prayer
for the division or allotment, and thereupon all persons interested in the property,
who have not united in the petition, shall be summoned to appear and answer the
petition on the first day of the next term of the court.
The combination of these provisions produced the partition law of Arkansas in POPE's Di-
GEST § 10509:
Any person desiring a division of land held in joint tenancy, in common or in
coparceny shall file in the circuit court a written petition in which a description of
the property, the names of those having an interest in it, and the amount of such
interest shall be briefly stated in ordinary language, with a prayer for the division,
and for a sale thereof if it shall appear that partition can not be made without great
prejudice to the owners, and thereupon all persons interested in the property who
have not united in the petition shall be summoned to appear and answer the peti-
tion on the first day of the next term of the court.
The current version of Arkansas' partition statute is codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1801
(1962), set out at note 1 supra.
Professor Powell has categorized the partition statutes of the 50 states and the District of
Columbia. According to Powell, there are 19 other states in which the partition statutes
have generally allowed joint tenants and tenants in common of future interests to compel
partition: Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. Five states extend the right to
partition to such owners only in a partial and incomplete manner. They are Alabama, Con-
necticut, Indiana, Maine, and New Jersey.
The remaining 25 states and the District of Columbia have partition statutes which
definitely or most likely restrict partition to persons with present possessory interests: Colo-
rado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. For a
more detailed analysis, see 2A R. POWELL, supra note 4, at 290.
10. See note 7 supra. In an early New Jersey case, the court held that the English
partition statutes were not intended to apply to remaindermen. Only those entitled to pres-
ent possession were allowed this right. Stevens v. Enders, 13 N.J.L. 271, 275 (1833).
11. London v. Overby, 40 Ark. 155, 156 (1882).
12. 201 Ark. 63, 143 S.W.2d 560 (1940).
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half interest held by Krickerberg. Hoff sought partition, which the
court permitted. When the court applied its test of present posses-
sion in order to determine whether a cotenancy existed, it found that
Hoff owned a present undivided one-half interest in the property
and that he could compel partition under the statute.' 3
The Arkansas partition statute was amended in 1941.14 The
amendment, which inserted the language at issue in Henry v. Ken-
nedy, added the words "having any interest in" and "absolutely or
subject to the life estate of another or otherwise." Although the
amendment purported to extend partition rights to persons not enti-
tled to partition under the Krickerberg decision, subsequent cases
were decided according to common-law precedent. ' 5 The court con-
tinued to equate cotenancy with possession, and engaged in com-
mon-law decision-making instead of relying on the statute's plain
meaning. 16
In Monroe v. Monroe'7 a life tenant in exclusive possession at-
tempted to compel partition against a remainderman who did not
have a present interest in the property. The life estate was held by
one person exclusively; there was no cotenancy between the life ten-
ant and the remainderman, and the court did not allow partition.'8
13. Id at 65-67, 143 S.W.2d at 561-62. In Kennedy v. Henry, 270 Ark. 275, 604 S.W.2d
585 (Ct. App. 1980), the court of appeals emphasized the statutory requirement of a coten-
ancy. The court relied heavily on the Krickerberg test of present possession, and stated that
because remaindermen do not have present possession, they cannot be cotenants. Thus, it
held that remaindermen cannot compel partition under the statute. fd at 276, 604 S.W.2d
at 585.
14. 1941 Ark. Acts 92, § 1. The statute was again amended in 1947 to permit a tenant of
an estate by the entirety to compel partition. 1947 Ark. Acts 161, § 1. See generally Rodgers
v. Rodgers, 271 Ark. 762, 611 S.W.2d 175 (1981) (effect of foreign divorce decree on title to
land in Arkansas); Brown v. Brown, 233 Ark. 422, 345 S.W.2d 27 (1961) (partition not al-
lowed because divorce occurred before amendment).
In 1957 the statute was amended a third time to allow one who has an interest in as-
signed or unassigned dower or curtesy to compel partition. 1957 Ark. Acts 324, § 1. See
generally Gibson v. Gibson, 264 Ark. 418, 572 S.W.2d 146 (1978) (holder of dower interest
may seek partition); Smith v. Smith, 235 Ark. 932, 362 S.W.2d 719 (1962) (same).
15. Eg., Luster v. Arnold, 249 Ark. 152, 458 S.W.2d 414 (1970); McGee v. Hatcher, 217
Ark. 402, 230 S.W.2d 41 (1950); Goodlett v. Goodlett, 209 Ark. 297, 190 S.W.2d 14 (1945).
Partition was allowed in each case because the remainderman seeking partition was a coten-
ant with the life estate holder. The remainderman had a present interest in the property.
16. In McGee v. Hatcher, 217 Ark. 402, 405, 230 S.W.2d 41, 43 (1950), the court placed
emphasis upon the Krickerberg test in determining whether the remainderman could compel
partition. Present possession was still stressed as essential to a remainderman's right to par-
tition; the court avoided the plain meaning of the amendment, which eliminated the require-
ment of present possession.
17. 226 Ark. 805, 294 S.W.2d 338 (1956).
18. Id at 807, 294 S.W.2d at 339.
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The Monroe court stated that the 1941 amendment was passed "to
allow the partition of property by remaindermen, subject to the life
estate of another. ... 1 Yet, in a footnote, the court emphasized
the requirement of possession, stating, "In the case of McGee v.
Hatcher, . . . we reiterated that the right of present possession be-
tween parties is essential to maintain partition. 20
The Monroe decision was reaffirmed in Bowman v. PhilliVs2' in
which a sole life tenant sought partition against the remainderman.
The action was not allowed because there was no cotenancy of the
life estate. As a first indication of allowing remaindermen to parti-
tion their respective future interests, the court suggested that the life
tenant, when he is also a remainderman, might compel partition of
the remainder interests, and give up the value of his life estate.22
Until Henry, the emphasis of the court had been upon the exist-
ence of a cotenancy between the parties to the partition action. In
its interpretation of the statute, the court of appeals in Henry fol-
lowed the common-law precedent, stressing such factors as coten-
ancy and present possession.23 The court also placed significance
upon the statutory language "held in" and applied the Krickerberg
test in deciding that present possession is essential when one "holds"
an interest in land.24
In reversing the court of appeals, the Arkansas Supreme Court
held that the partition statute does not limit partition actions to
those owning possessory interests.25 Although the court recognized
that the statute is contrary to the general rule at common law, it
stated that the General Assembly had expressly acknowledged the
right of remaindermen to compel partition by inserting into the stat-
19. Id at 808, 294 S.W.2d at 340 (court's emphasis).
20. Id. at 808, n.4, 294 S.W.2d at 340 (court's emphasis). Although these statements
appear to be contradictory, the court of appeals attempted to reconcile them in Kennedy v.
Henry, 270 Ark. 275, 277, 604 S.W.2d 585, 586 (Ct. App. 1980). That court stated that the
Monroe decision construed the statute to allow partition by remaindermen, subject to the
life estate of another, "if the remaindermen are also contenants to the holder of the life
estate." Id. at 281, 604 S.W.2d at 589 (court's emphasis).
21. 260 Ark. 496, 542 S.W.2d 740 (1976).
22. Id at 498, 542 S.W.2d at 741-42.
23. Kennedy v. Henry, 270 Ark. 275, 604 S.W.2d 585 (Ct. App. 1980).
24. Id at 277-78, 604 S.W.2d at 586-87. In the early case of Smith v. Gaines, 39 N.J.
Eq. 545 (1885), the words "held in," in a technical sense, were construed to mean the owner-
ship of an estate of present possession. Id at 547. The Smith decision was later discussed in
a Nebraska case which was factually similar to Henry. Baskins v. Krepcik, 153 Neb. 36, 43
N.W.2d 624 (1950). The court allowed partition by the remainderman because the Ne-
braska partition statute did not contain the language "held in."
25. Henry v. Kennedy, 273 Ark. 383, 386, 619 S.W.2d 632, 634 (1981).
19811
548 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:543
ute such language as "any persons having any interest in" and "sub-
ject to the life estate of another. ' 2 6  The court also placed
significance upon the emergency clauses of the amendments to the
statute, in which the legislature emphasized the importance of
broadening the scope of Arkansas' partition statute.27 The court
cited the Monroe case as specifically holding that partition by re-
maindermen is permitted, subject to the life estate of another.28 In
further support of its decision, the supreme court relied upon the
Restatement of Property 29 for guidance. The court's reliance upon
the Restatement prerequisites demonstrates that the remaindermen
in the Henry case met the test successfully. 3°
26. Id at 387, 619 S.W.2d at 634.
27. Id The emergency clause of Act 92 provides in pertinent part:
It is hereby found and declared by the General Assembly that the present statute
relative to partition of real property in Arkansas, having been enacted many years
ago, is inadequate and not broad enough to provide this form of relief in numerous
cases in the State of Arkansas, and which are working an unjust hardship upon
citizens owning property jointly, in common or in coparceny, absolutely or subject
to the life estate of another or otherwise, and that such condition is hindering the
alienation of real property and prejudicing the property rights of many citizens.
1941 Ark. Acts 92, § 3.
28. The court remarked that the court of appeals had used the Monroe case to support
its decision, see text at note 17 supra; the supreme court then suggested that the Monroe
decision must be read in reference to the unique issue in that case. The court cited Bowman
v. Phillips, 260 Ark. 496, 542 S.W.2d 740 (1976), as its reaffirmation of the principle set forth
in Monroe. Henry v. Kennedy, 273 Ark. 383, 387-88, 619 S•W.2d 632, 635 (1981).
29. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 175 (1936) provides:
(1) When a future interest in land is owned in a joint tenancy or in a tenancy in
common, then a concurrent owner in such future interest has power to compel
partition thereof when the requirements of all the Clauses of Subsection (2)
are satisfied.
(2) The prerequisites for the existence of the power stated in Subsection (1) are
the following:
(a) the state wherein the affected land is located has a statute which, in spe-
cific words, confers the power to compel partition on a joint tenant or
tenant in common in a "reversion or remainder," or in a "vested remain-
der or reversion," or in "an interest or estate in land," or which employs
other language of like import; and
(b) the joint tenant or tenant in common, in exercising such power, complies
with all requirements specified by such statute as to matters other than
the prerequisite variety of future interest; and
(c) the creator of the concurrently owned future interest has not manifested
effectively an intent that no such power to compel partition be present
. and
(d) the future interest of such joint tenant or tenant in common is a future
estate in fee simple absolute not subject to a condition precedent.
30. Henry v. Kennedy, 273 Ark. 383, 388, 619 S.W.2d 632, 635 (1981). It is important to
note that subsection 2(d) of RESTATEMENT § 175 requires the future interest to be vested and
not subject to a condition precedent. The court remarked that the remaindermen in Henry
NOTES
The holding of the court, allowing remaindermen with nonpos-
sessory interests to compel partition, appears at first to be contrary
to the historical progression of Arkansas partition law. Before the
1941 amendment, the statutory and common-law principles were
consistent in requiring present possession. After the amendment,
the court continued to decide partition cases on the basis of com-
mon-law principles. Until the Henry case, however, the facts of
these cases never warranted a plain meaning interpretation of the
statute's new language nor did they warrant an abandonment of the
case law precedent. Under either theory, the cases would have been
decided the same way. Although the fact situations in Monroe and
Bowman were distinguishable from previous cases, the court was
still able to rely upon the theory of cotenancy and present possession
in order to dispose of these cases. However, the suggestion made by
the court in Bowman indicated that it might allow partition by a
remainderman against other remaindermen. 1
The issue in the Henry case was one of first impression. There
was no direct point of law upon which to decide the case; thus, the
court of appeals chose one line of reasoning and the supreme court
chose another. The court of appeals based its decision upon the
common-law precedent, the technical sense of the statutory lan-
guage, and the well-settled historical background of partition law.
It is significant that the reasoning of the court of appeals points di-
rectly to the requirement of present possession. The technical sense
of the terms "cotenancy" and "held in" seems to strengthen the
court's analysis, and yet the supreme court rejected that analysis and
construed the statute based on its plain meaning. The legislature
did not restrict partition to those with possessory interests, and it
demonstrated a clear intent to broaden the scope of Arkansas parti-
tion law. The broad interpretation of the statute permits those who
own future interests in land to enjoy the fruits of their interests
before the expiration of the life term. For example, if the life tenant
is young, it would be very likely that a middle-aged remainderman
would never receive the benefits of his future interest. If partition is
allowed, the remainderman may receive his portion of the sale of
had vested remainders and that other jurisdictions which allow partition by remaindermen
also require the future interest to be indefeasibly vested. This statement indicates that per-
sons having contingent remainders do not come within the scope of the Henry decision or
the Arkansas partition statute.
31. See text at note 21 supra.
19811
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the future interests, subject to the life estate,32 and enjoy his future
interest during his lifetime.
Jo Carol Jones Gill
32. It is apparent that any partition of future interests would remain subject to the pres-
ent life estate. Although the future interests in the property could be partitioned, the life'
tenant would still be entitled to his estate, and the purchaser of the future interest would be
allowed to take possession upon the termination of the life estate.
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